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Truth or Consequences: An Experiment 
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brandts@cc.uab.es * charness@econ.ucsb.edu 
T his paper presents evidence that the willingness to punish an unfair action is sensitive 
to whether this action was preceded by a deceptive message. One player first sends a 
message indicating an intended play, which is either favorable or unfavorable to the other 
player in the game. After the message, the sender and the receiver play a simultaneous 2 x 2 
game, in which the sender may or may not play according to his message. Outcome cells may, 
hence, be reached following true or false messages. In the third stage, the receiver may (at a 
cost) punish or reward, depending on which cell of the simultaneous game has been reached. 
We test whether receivers' rates of monetary sacrifice depend on the process by which an 
outcome is reached. We study two decision-elicitation methods: the strategy and the direct 
response methods. For each method, deception more than doubles the punishment rate as a 
response to an action that is unfavorable to the receiver. We also find evidence that 17-25% of 
all participants choose to reward a favorable action choice made by the sender, even though 
doing so leaves one at a payoff disadvantage. Our results reflect on current economic models 
of utility and have implications for organizational decision-making behavior. 
(Laboratory Experiments; Reciprocity; Fair Process; Honorable Behavior; Deception; Punishment) 
1. Introduction 
Notions of fair process and honorable behavior have 
potentially important implications for social and 
economic interactions, which may be found in negoti- 
ations or organizations. Negotiators often have incen- 
tives to mislead others and private information may 
present the opportunity for doing so. Managers may 
be tempted to use deception to improve the chances 
of a desired response from a group of employees. 
However, there may be significant limitations to this 
kind of behavior: Where the character of interac- 
tion is highly interpersonal in nature, one must take 
into account the potential impact of social considera- 
tions on one's motivation, as this may impose bounds 
on selfish or dishonest behavior. We feel that it is 
a natural intuition that deception will be considered 
inappropriate behavior and may lead to substantial 
punishment behavior by the deceived. The experi- 
ment we present allows us to subject this intuition to 
a rigorous test. 
The reaction to deception may also be generally 
relevant in the context of the current process of for- 
mulating more accurate theoretical models of human 
motivation. The most common assumption in eco- 
nomics is that people only care about maximizing 
their own income. But a large body of research has 
shown that many people choose to sacrifice money 
in laboratory experiments. A number of recent for- 
mal models presume that people are also motivated 
by considerations of altruism, inequity, and aspects of 
the process by which an allocation is reached; while 
people may, nevertheless, maximize their utility, one's 
own money is not the sole determinant of utility. 
This paper reports experimental results in a game 
with communication and the possibility of costly ret- 
ribution.1 Our design uses a game with three stages. 
Figure 1 shows the central building block of our 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines retribution as 
"the dispensing or awarding of punishment or reward according 
to the deserts of the individual." 
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Figure 1 Second Stage Game 
B1 B2 
Al 2, 2 6, 9 
A2 2, 2 12, 3 
experimental design; the two numbers in each cell 
below refer to the respective material payoffs for the 
row and column players. 
In the first stage, player A sends a costless and non- 
binding message to player B, stating that he intends to 
play Al or intends to play A2. In the second stage, the 
players then simultaneously choose actions, and one 
of the cells of the Figure 1 matrix is reached. Note that 
each cell can be reached via two different message- 
action paths-the sender may play in accordance with 
his message or he may not. In the third stage, player B 
may have additional options: If the outcome cell (A2, 
B2) is reached, player B can accept the (12, 3) out- 
come or change it to (2, 2). If the outcome cell (Al, B2) 
is reached, player B can accept the (6, 9) outcome or 
change it to (8, 7). Our experimental design includes 
possible misrepresentation, and provides a retribution 
mechanism with monetary consequences. This allows 
a clear expression of one's objection to deception. 
Previous studies have demonstrated that people are 
willing to punish unfair actions, even at a personal 
cost. Fehr and Gachter (2000) find that free riders 
in a public goods experiment are heavily punished, 
and that this leads to substantially higher levels of 
cooperation. Sefton et al. (2000) also note that sanc- 
tions in a public goods experiment are quite effec- 
tive in achieving stable group allocations. Boles et al. 
(2000) study ultimatum game behavior when the pro- 
poser and the responder may have private informa- 
tion concerning the pie size or the outside (rejection) 
payoff, respectively, and can exchange written mes- 
sages. In their repeated-game fixed-matching design, 
they find that revelation of deceptive claims did 
not substantially increase deceptive proposers' sub- 
sequent offers, but responders who learn they have 
been deceived are more likely to reject these subse- 
quent offers. However, in this design one's reaction to 
deception is mixed in with possible strategic consid- 
erations, because it is common information that one 
will be paired with the same person for the duration 
of the experiment. 
With the study of the game presented above, we 
wish to add to the analysis of the effects of decep- 
tion in both organizational settings and strategic sit- 
uations. Previous works by Anton (1990), Lewicki 
(1983), and Shapiro and Bies (1994) find that decep- 
tion or lying can lead to moral outrage, and damage 
ongoing organizational relationships. Schweitzer and 
Croson (1999, p. 1) suggest that "deception in organi- 
zations represents a significant managerial challenge 
across a broad range of functional areas." Our study 
provides clear and direct evidence that the willing- 
ness to punish an unfair action depends not only on 
the payoff outcomes in the relevant options, but also 
on the process that has led to the choice at hand. We 
use a design in which people interact with each other, 
at most once, minimizing strategic reasons for pun- 
ishment. The punishment cell (A2, B2) can be reached 
after either an accurate (A2) or deceptive (Al) mes- 
sage; regardless of the message, player B faces the 
same possible payoffs and the same choice between 
outcomes in the (A2, B2) cell. The only difference is 
the veracity of the message, and the substantial dif- 
ferences that we observe in punishment rates indicate 
that this element of the process is quite important to 
people. 
Recent economic models of utility include some 
social values and preferences in the analysis. These 
models can be categorized by whether the process 
by which an allocation is reached and the perceived 
intentions of other players are relevant to an indi- 
vidual's preferences and choices. Purely distributional 
models assert that while people may sacrifice money 
to reduce disparities in material payoffs, they are 
unconcerned with the process leading to these pay- 
offs. Yet there is evidence that this is psychologically 
incorrect. In an example from the field, Kitzmann 
and Emery (1993) study parental satisfaction in child 
custody disputes, finding that differences in fathers' 
overall satisfaction can be attributed to procedural 
factors.2 
2Couples were randomly assigned to mediate or litigate their 
child custody dispute. In nearly every case, physical custody was 
awarded to the mother. Yet fathers were far more satisfied with the 
mediation process. 
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Sen (1997, p. 745) proposes that "a person's pref- 
erences over comprehensive outcomes (including the 
choice process) must be distinguished from the con- 
ditional preferences over culmination outcomes given 
the acts of choice," where the expression "culmination 
outcomes" refers to material outcomes. He contends 
that choice functions and preferences may be affected 
by considerations such as "the identity of the chooser, 
the menu over which choice is being made, and 
the relation of the particular act to behavioral social 
norms that constrain particular social actions." Blount 
(1995), Charness (1996), and Offerman (forthcoming) 
find evidence of Sen's chooser dependence: In sequen- 
tial experimental games, second-mover responses dif- 
fer according to whether the choice set is believed 
to be determined by a self-interested player or by a 
random mechanism. Brandts and Sola (2001), Char- 
ness and Rabin (2002), and Falk et al. (2003) have 
demonstrated the relevance of Sen's menu dependence: 
First-mover foregone alternatives significantly affect 
the choice made by the second player. 
The models of pure distribution (e.g., Bolton and 
Ockenfels 2000, Fehr and Schmidt 1999) do not reflect 
menu dependence or chooser dependence, while the 
reciprocity models (e.g., Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 
1998, Falk and Fischbacher 1999, Charness and Rabin 
2002) reflect both of these concepts. People's eval- 
uation of deception would seem to fit well into at 
least the spirit of this general framework. However, 
the models that formalize the notion that preferences 
depend on comprehensive outcomes all focus on the 
actual choices made from the feasible choice set, and 
they do not explicitly consider the effect on utility 
from statements about intended play.3 To the extent 
3Rabin (1998) states that "people determine their dispositions 
towards others according to motives attributed to these others, not 
solely according to actions taken" (p. 22). Models such as Rabin 
(1993), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (1998), Falk and Fischbacher 
(1999), and Charness and Rabin (2002), discussed further in ?2.3, 
consider the decisions and motivations of other agents to be impor- 
tant determinants of behavior. A key common element in these 
models is that perceived intentions are important: Why did another 
player make a particular choice? What was he trying to achieve 
and how appropriate is this goal? 
that self-serving lies affect utility independently of 
their effects on material payoffs, a new model is 
needed.4 
There is a considerable theoretical and experimental 
literature on cheap talk (see Crawford 1998 for a sur- 
vey). Typically, the issues considered are conditions 
under which cheap talk is informative and effective in 
achieving a desirable equilibrium or equilibria, under 
the assumption of standard (i.e., self-interested pecu- 
niary) preferences. Essentially, deception (and cheap 
talk generally) is evaluated only with respect to how 
the payoff choice sets are affected, and not as an 
action per se. 
We think that a retributive reaction to deception is 
potentially an important aspect of preferences over 
comprehensive outcomes, and we are not aware of 
any studies that specifically examine (costly) reactions 
to misleading messages in one-shot environments. We 
study behavior for two different response elicitation 
methods: The strategy method (contingent responses 
made at every possible decision node), or the more 
standard direct-response method (responses made 
only to actual choices made and presented to the 
responder). 
In using both elicitation methods, we find that 
many people send misleading messages, and that 
people do sacrifice money to punish and reward. Sig- 
nificantly, we see a negative reaction to self-serving 
deception in both cases: Punishment rates are, indeed, 
higher when there has been a deceitful Al mes- 
sage. Interestingly, punishment rate levels with direct 
responses are roughly double those with contingent 
responses. Reward rates are also somewhat higher, as 
25% vs. 17% of our participants reward an Al move 
by transferring two payoff units to the sender, thereby 
coming out behind instead of ahead. 
Our results suggest that managers and negotiators 
should be aware of possible negative consequences 
from deliberate misrepresentation. In many situations 
(incentive pay, promotions, etc.), the truth is eventu- 
ally learned and misrepresentations are exposed. It 
appears that deception may be a breach of behavioral 
social norms. 
4 Dufwenberg (2002), discussed in ?2.3, does study some aspects of 
the breaking of promises. 
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2. Fair Process, Communication, 
and Models of Utility 
In this section, we first review some relevant literature 
on fair process, deception, and cheap talk. We then 
discuss the extent to which these issues are treated in 
recent utility models, and explore the predictions of 
these models in our game. 
2.1. Fair Process and Deception 
Material outcomes and payoffs are certainly a crucial 
factor in determining preferences and decisions, how- 
ever, there may be other influences. There is a large 
body of work on procedural justice that supports 
the premise that process satisfaction is an important 
ingredient of human motivation. Thibaut and Walker 
(1975) and Tyler (1988, 1990) have argued that rela- 
tional issues may dominate definitions of justice, and 
that procedural satisfaction may be as important as 
outcome satisfaction. In the context of the study of 
organizations, Kim and Mauborgne (1996, p. 499) find 
that "the exercise of procedural justice inspires man- 
agers to go beyond the call of duty and engage in 
innovative actions ... on behalf of the organization." 
In this sense, procedural justice can inspire organiza- 
tional citizenship behavior. There is also evidence that 
perceived procedural unfairness can lead to retalia- 
tory behavior. Robinson and Bennett (1995) examine 
how employees respond to violations of the psycho- 
logical contract and find behavior such as stealing 
from the company or coworkers, wasting company 
resources, lying about hours worked, and wrongfully 
blaming coworkers for mistakes. 
Perceptions of the fairness of the process are also 
important for resource allocation in markets, negoti- 
ations, and labor relations. Kahnemann et al. (1986), 
Barrett-Howard and Tyler (1986), and Bies et al. (1993) 
find that procedural information influences judg- 
ments of market exploitations. In their survey on fair- 
ness in negotiations, Tripp et al. (1995) suggest that 
the allocation of resources may be of less concern to 
individual agents than procedural and interactional 
fairness. Charness and Levine (2000) find that the per- 
ceived fairness of a layoff is highly dependent on the 
manner in which the layoff is implemented. 
Many studies in business ethics and negotiation 
address the specific issue of deception and its effects 
on behavior. While a satisfied party is more likely to 
maintain a positive and productive relationship with 
others in the environment, violations in relationships 
can lead to negative affect or even moral outrage. This 
is particularly true in the case of lying in negotia- 
tions (Anton 1990, Lewicki 1983). Although some feel 
that deception is just part of the negotiation "dance," 
others (e.g., Shapiro and Bies 1994) believe that such 
behavior can destroy trust and cooperation in ongo- 
ing organizational relationships. Bies and Tripp (1995) 
suggest that the harm done to the relationship by 
lying may be irreversible. Schweitzer et al. (1999) find 
36 of 66 "union negotiators" punish deceptive "city 
negotiators" when the true state of affairs is revealed, 
and that the distinction between lies of omission and 
lies of commission is important. 
Lewicki and Stark (1996) analyze subjects' eval- 
uations of ethically questionable negotiation tactics. 
They suggest that players' perceptions of the "game" 
being played may be important. If people expect lies 
and deception, these may not produce much of a neg- 
ative response. In Roth and Murnighan (1982), dis- 
belief of messages was common. The stakes involved 
may also affect expectations: Tanbrunsel (1998) finds 
that increased incentives lead to more misrepresen- 
tation, and that the greater the incentive one has to 
engage in misrepresentation, the more that he expects 
that an opponent will do so. 
Romer (1996, p. 199) discusses the effects of decep- 
tion in a political economy context. In his analysis, 
the U.S. Social Security system was created as an enti- 
tlement program: Payroll taxes were bundled with an 
explicit promise of certain future transfers. The rea- 
son why it is politically difficult to cut back benefits 
is that "the act of making, then breaking, a promise 
induces a taste for punishing the offender." In the 
political sphere, the punishment would be expressed 
through people voting against those who proposed a 
reduction in benefits. 
2.2. Cheap Talk 
To the extent that promises or statements are unen- 
forceable, they can be considered to be a form of 
cheap talk. While a message does not necessarily con- 
vey any information, subsequent behavior may be 
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affected if a message is considered credible. Craw- 
ford (1998) points out that even under the assumption 
of standard preferences, there is typically a problem 
of multiple equilibria.5 Traditional equilibrium refine- 
ments are not generally helpful in this selection pro- 
cess. Farrell (1993) proposes restrictions based on the 
plausibility of out-of-equilibrium messages and Rabin 
(1990) presents a nonequilibrium concept that com- 
bines a credibility restriction with an assumption that 
players maximize their expected payoffs given their 
beliefs. These devices yield substantial and plausible 
restrictions on behavior, but maximizing is still purely 
defined by own monetary payoffs. 
Experimentally, many studies find that cheap talk is 
quite effective in achieving Pareto-efficient outcomes. 
This is particularly true when players' interests are 
largely (or completely) in alignment. Cooper et al. 
(1992) observe a high degree of success in attain- 
ing the payoff-dominant equilibrium outcome in a 
coordination game. Charness (2000) finds that one- 
sided announcements of intended Pareto-optimal (but 
risky) play are extremely effective in a Stag Hunt 
game, despite the fact that such messages may be self- 
serving and, hence, potentially less trustworthy. 
Cheap talk is less effective when interests are in 
conflict, as false signals may not be credible. Sell and 
Wilson (1997) allow participants in a public goods 
game to announce their intended contributions for 
the next period. Most announcements promised a 
higher level of contribution than was actually made, 
although the rate of "lying" decreased when people 
could check on each other's behavior; communication 
only enhanced cooperation with verification. In a Pris- 
oners' Dilemma game in Charness (2000), 90% of all 
players ignored announcements of intended coopera- 
tion.6 
In our setting, cheap talk is not really a coordinating 
device as much as it is an indicator of an A player's 
perceptions of the relevant social noms and of B's 
5For example, in any cheap-talk environment there is always a 
"babbling equilibrium" in which messages are ignored. 
6 On the other hand, Dawes et al. (1977) find that "relevant" (dis- 
cussion about the situation at hand) face-to-face communication 
leads to a substantially higher rate of cooperation in a commons 
dilemma situation. 
understanding of the game structure. What message 
do people think will be use, and are their beliefs cor- 
rect? Cheap talk could potentially serve to achieve 
higher total payoffs by encouraging a B2 play. How- 
ever, because the (2, 2) that would result from a B1 
play can also be achieved after (A2, B2), there is lit- 
tle reason to play B1 and it is, in fact, a rare choice.7 
Nevertheless, an A player may have so little trust in 
a B player's "rationality" that it seems worthwhile to 
advertise an Al play, and we shall see that deceptive 
Al messages are common. 
2.3. Existing Models of Social Utility 
and Our Hypotheses 
The literature reviewed in ?2.1 provides many 
insights into the behavioral effects induced by unfair 
processes and deception. To what extent are these 
effects addressed in current utility models? Recent 
models of social preferences can explain punishment 
(and, perhaps, even reward). However, differential 
rates of punishment, the primary focus of our study, 
can only be the result of procedural distaste, as the set 
of payoffs available to B is independent of the signal 
sent by A. 
Material reward is an important component of 
utility in all of the models mentioned in the pre- 
vious section. Yet, many experimental participants 
show signs that nonpecuniary concerns are relevant 
to their decisions. For example, in the classic ulti- 
matum game (Giith et al. 1982), many people reject 
unfair proposals, instead choosing zero payoffs for 
both themselves and the proposers. Difference- or 
inequality-aversion models such as Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) assert that 
people dislike unequal payoffs, but are indifferent to 
the process leading to their choice between outcomes. 
These models predict possible punishment in our 
game, as some B's may prefer (2, 2) to (12, 3). How- 
ever, the rate of punishment should not be affected 
by whether or not a false announcement has led to 
7In a sense, this serves as an embedded rationality test. If we 
observed many people choosing B1, we would be concerned that 
many people misunderstood the structure of the game. We see that 
B1 was chosen only 5% of the time, but many A's apparently did 
not trust that B's would choose B2 after an A2 signal and, therefore, 
signaled Al. 
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this choice, so that the act of deception should not 
affect player B's action after the (A2, B2) cell has been 
reached. 
On the other hand, models of reciprocity prefer- 
ences include the issue of intention, the motivation 
or goal behind an action made by a (self-interested) 
party. In these models, a reciprocal action is the 
behavioral response to an action that is perceived as 
potentially "unkind" or "kind." It may make a big 
difference whether a particular action was intended 
or not. If an action was intentional, it also matters why 
it was chosen. If one perceives that another person is 
being kind or unkind by choosing a particular action 
or strategy, one may respond by sacrificing money to 
help or hurt this other person. Beliefs about the beliefs 
of other players are important. 
One might suppose that the intention to deceive 
someone would naturally be seen as being unkind 
and unfriendly. However, the reciprocity models mea- 
sure intention by comparing the outcomes available 
as a result of another player's choice(s) to the full 
range of potential outcomes, given the alternatives 
available to the other player. So an act of deception 
is only seen in a negative light if it unfavorably influ- 
ences the victim's material outcome possibility set. 
Rabin (1993) explicitly defines kindness in terms of 
the best and the worst material outcomes that could 
result from another player's strategy. Dufwenberg 
and Kirchsteiger (1998) modify and extend this model 
so as to be more applicable to sequential games; again, 
the kindness of an action is defined in relation to its 
effects on the range of feasible material outcomes.8 
Two recent models combine preferences over the 
distribution of material payoffs with reciprocity-based 
preferences. Falk and Fischbacher (1999) present a 
theory combining reciprocity with concerns about rel- 
ative payoffs. In this model, the degree to which 
player B perceives that a particular outcome has been 
intentionally chosen depends on the options avail- 
able to A.9 B's perceptions of player A's kindness and 
intention influence B's choice. 
8We thank Matthew Rabin and Martin Dufwenberg for helpful 
comments in this regard. 
9 For example, if player A has only two options (say 1 and 2), and 
each of these gives player B a choice between (8, 2) or (0, 0), A's 
choice of option 1 would not be considered intentional or unkind. 
Charness and Rabin (2002) motivate personal finan- 
cial sacrifice by combining classical utilitarianism 
with Rawlsian preferences: People like to increase the 
social surplus (the total material payoff), but care 
more about helping low-payoff people than high- 
payoff people. However, they will withdraw their 
willingness to sacrifice for these principles according 
to their beliefs about how others are not following 
them, and may also have a taste for punishment (low- 
ering their own payoffs to hurt bad actors). There is 
no positive reciprocity in this model: A decent per- 
son is supposed to do the right thing and receives no 
reward for actually doing it. 
None of the reciprocity models mentioned predict 
that the punishment rate at (A2, B2) will depend on 
the message about intended play. Suppose that a false 
Al signal is seen as an attempt to induce a B2 play; if 
player B chooses B2, he foregoes the (2, 2) payoff from 
B1. Yet in Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg and Kirch- 
steiger (1998), no player will prefer (2, 2) to either 
(12, 3) or (6, 9) absent negative reciprocity, so a pre- 
emptive play of B1 should not be made. While the 
action A2 may trigger B's annoyance that his final 
choice is between (12, 3) and (2, 2), instead of being 
between (6, 9) and (8, 7), the degree of annoyance is 
independent of the message. 
In Charness and Rabin (2002), it is also true that 
everyone prefers (12, 3) to (2, 2) if the punishment 
parameter f has not been activated by player A's mis- 
behavior. B1 play should not be observed, and the 
arguments above also apply here.10 In Falk and Fis- 
chbacher (1999), it is possible that B would prefer 
(2, 2) to (12, 3) purely due to distributive concerns, so 
a false Al signal could be seen as having some effect 
on B play. Nevertheless, even if B preferred (2, 2) to 
(12, 3), he can still impose the (2, 2) outcome by choos- 
ing to punish A. These models do not predict that 
punishment rates will depend on the process leading 
to the (12, 3) outcome.1 
10 There is a caveat, however,f is a free parameter, so that one could 
(in principle) consider the taste for punishment to be sensitive to 
the simple act of deception. But this is not explicitly modeled. 
11 It is possible that if B strongly expects an A2 play and has a self- 
control problem, he might wish to tie her hands by playing B1. 
However, the issue of self-control is far beyond the scope of these 
models. 
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The closest analysis is the Dufwenberg (2002) psy- 
chological marital investment game, in which the second- 
mover spouse has pecuniary incentives to defect from 
his or her earlier promise to stay married, but may be 
constrained by guilt feelings from promise breaking. 
These feelings are linked to the promiser's second- 
order beliefs about the trust level of the other spouse. 
While punishment is not considered in this game, 
incorporating social preferences in the utility function 
would allow punishment choices based on the per- 
ceived degree of violated trust. 
We can now formulate our hypotheses. The null 
hypothesis is simply given by the standard model 
of individualistic preferences and predicts no punish- 
ment, no reward and, hence, excludes any differences 
in punishment or reward rates. Our first alternative 
hypothesis, Hypothesis 1, posits that overall punish- 
ment rate will be significantly different from zero; it is 
consistent with all the social utility models discussed 
above. 
HYPOTHESIS 1. A significant proportion of B players 
will choose to convert (12, 3) to (2, 2) after A2, B2 play. 
The two remaining hypotheses go beyond the 
above models and capture process satisfaction aspects 
of social interaction. Hypothesis 2 formulates the dif- 
ferential punishment conjecture. 
HYPOTHESIS 2. The proportion of B players choosing to 
convert (12, 3) to (2, 2) will be greater after an Al signal 
than after an A2 signal. 
The predictions of the social utility models are 
somewhat mixed with respect to whether B may 
choose to reward an Al play. The distributional mod- 
els cannot easily accommodate such a choice.12 The 
Charness and Rabin (2002) model does little bet- 
ter, as only a high weight on the minimum payoff 
12 It is easy to prove that changing the payoffs from (6, 9) to (8, 7) is 
incompatible with the parameter constraints in Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999). Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) do not provide a functional 
form, so no firm conclusions can be reached. However, the loss 
of 2 units of pay would be compared with a mild improvement 
in relative payoffs, so that this choice could only occur with an 
extreme degree of difference aversion. 
can explain reward. Because Rabin (1993), Dufwen- 
berg and Kirchsteiger (1998), and Falk and Fis- 
chbacher (1999) allow positive reciprocity, the deci- 
sion to reward can be explained for B's, but only 
with high reciprocity parameters. Nevertheless, we 
expected to see a sizable proportion of positive recip- 
rocal responses after an Al play. Accordingly, our 
third alternative hypothesis is 
HYPOTHESIS 3. There will be a significant reward rate 
for Al, B2 play. 
We have no hypothesis concerning differences in 
reward rates across messages. 
3. Experimental Design 
and Procedures 
We conducted our experimental sessions at the Uni- 
versity of California, Berkeley. A total of 212 people 
participated in one of the eight sessions. Each unit 
of experimental payoffs was set equal to $1.50; aver- 
age earnings were around $16, including a $5-showup 
fee, for the 1-hour session. Recruiting was conducted 
primarily through the use of campus e-mail lists. An 
e-mail message that was sent to randomly selected 
people through the Colleges of Letters, Arts, and 
Sciences provided the bulk of the participants, so 
our sessions typically included individuals from a 
broader range of academic disciplines than is com- 
mon in economics experiments. Because the vast 
majority of Berkeley students use e-mail, selection 
bias from this recruiting method should be mini- 
mal, at least with respect to other laboratory exper- 
iments. Instructions are provided in the appendix 
(mansci.pubs.informs.org/ecompanion.html). 
People met in a large classroom that was divided 
into two sides. Individuals sat at nonadjacent desks 
where instruction packages had been placed. The sub- 
jects on opposite sides of the room had different roles 
(A or B), with each person on one side of the room 
paired with one person on the other side of the room. 
As mentioned in ?1, there are three stages in 
our game. The first is the announcement stage, the 
second is the simultaneous choice stage, and the 
third is the retribution stage. In the first stage, each 
person in the sender role sends an announcement 
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about his intended play to an anonymous receiver: 
The announcement is a nonbinding statement about 
which choice, Al or A2, the sender will make in 
the second stage. In the second stage, after the mes- 
sage has been transmitted, both players simultane- 
ously choose actions. The sender chooses between Al 
and A2 and the receiver chooses between B1 and B2. 
In the third stage, the receiver has an option to change 
the payoffs if he has played B2. If (Al, B2) has been 
chosen, he can give the sender 2 units and so change 
the payoffs to (8, 7). If (A2, B2) is the outcome, he can 
change the payoffs from (12, 3) to (2, 2). Matched play- 
ers can reach the (A2, B2) cell by two message-action 
paths-one where the message has been Al and the 
other where the message has been A2.13 
If money is the only element in one's utility 
function, the only subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium 
involves actions (A2, B2) without punishment or 
reward in the third stage; the message is irrelevant. 
Two other Nash-equilibrium-strategy combinations, 
both of which presume there is nonpecuniary utility, 
consist of the sender playing Al and B punishing A2, 
and (1) not rewarding Al, or (2) rewarding A2. 
The experimental design and the payoff calibra- 
tion are motivated by several considerations. First, 
we wanted a simple environment, where the (binary) 
choices and associated payoffs were transparent to 
the players. Another issue relates to our main objec- 
tive of having an environment in which it is plausible 
to expect self-serving lies. In our game, we expected 
many senders' preferred outcome to be (12, 3) and, 
therefore, their preferred action in the simultaneous 
choice stage to be A2. However, a sender may be con- 
cerned that a receiver will choose B1 after an A2 mes- 
sage, and so may send an Al message to encourage a 
B2 choice, but then actually play A2.14 
13 There is a second possibility for false messages in our design. 
The sender may announce A2 and then choose Al, behaving more 
favorably to the receiver than announced. A possible rationale for 
this behavior is to surprise the receiver to elicit the reward. As will 
be shown, we observed numerous instances of this behavior. 
14 It is true that a B player who has chosen B2 because of an Al 
signal may wish to punish an A2 play and, hence, make A's lie 
useless. However, some A's may believe that B's will not always 
choose to punish. In our one-shot environment, we do not expect 
A's beliefs and B's beliefs to be correct. 
Given that the punishment payoffs in the retri- 
bution stage of the game are (2, 2), there is really 
no obvious reason for the receiver to choose B1 in 
the action stage. However, there may exist plausible 
explanations for receivers choosing Bl; the fact that it 
is not completely transparent why the sender should 
expect a B1 choice after an A2 message does not inter- 
fere with the analysis we wish to perform. As long as 
we obtain sufficient observations of the (A2, B2) cell 
being reached after Al and A2 announcements, we 
can compare receivers' behavior in the two cases. 
Having the punishment payoffs be the same as the 
Bl payoffs is particularly useful with respect to the 
utility models earlier discussed, because allowing B 
to return to the B1 payoffs means that B's payoff 
range is unaffected by whether an Al message is 
false. In a sense, this permits us to isolate the effect 
of the deception per se, without respect to its influ- 
ence on the payoffs available. If we had allowed the 
B1 payoffs to be different than the punishment pay- 
offs, the pure effect from deception would have been 
confounded by possible effects from a change in the 
payoff range induced by a false signal. Nevertheless, 
other B1 payoffs could have been chosen. We wanted 
to have (Al, B1) and (A2, B1) payoffs identical so that 
an unhappy player B could unilaterally determine the 
result in the game. The payoff combination we chose 
was calibrated to yield a sizable proportion of both 
false statements by A and B2 choices.15 
Following Bolton et al. (2000) and Brandts and 
Charness (2000), each game was played twice, so that 
each person was a sender once and a receiver once. 
Participants were assured that no two people were 
ever paired twice, and were not informed about the 
final outcome of the first play of the game when they 
15 We did not make reward symmetric with punishment; suppose 
B could reward A by changing the (6, 9) payoffs to (16, 8). This 
social payoff could be so attractive that we might not observe much 
deception. In any event, our aim here was not to determine the 
respective strengths of the impulses to reward or punish, but rather 
to see if some B's would choose to reward an Al play even when 
it was relatively unattractive to do so. Thus, we made reward a 
1-1 transfer from player B to player A, such that the direction of 
their relative payoffs is reversed. No additional social surplus is 
generated by a reward, and voluntarily relegating one's self to the 
lower material payoff seems psychologically unappealing. 
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made their decisions for the second play. This feature 
allows us to obtain data from one-shot interactions 
and also permits us to examine whether subjects play 
in a consistent manner across roles.16 If the decision 
to punish deception is not influenced by whether one 
has sent (or intends to send) a false message, punish- 
ment could be seen as not being based on a consistent 
behavioral norm. Following the two periods, a coin 
was tossed to determine the period used for actual 
payment. 
The choice of response-elicitation method is an 
important issue in experimental economics, as there 
is a tension between efficiency in data gathering and 
the quality of the data. We collected data for two dif- 
ferent response-elicitation methods. In our first five 
sessions, receivers were not told the decisions actually 
made by the senders before they were asked for their 
choices of whether to punish or reward. Instead, each 
receiver (who knew the message he had received) was 
asked to designate (after his B2 play) a contingent 
choice if the sender actually played Al and a contin- 
gent choice if the sender actually played A2.17 One 
obvious advantage of this approach is that we can 
obtain a full set of two responses regardless of the 
sender's play. 
This strategy method (Selten 1967) plausibly induces 
different behavior than does the standard "direct- 
response" method. Roth (1995, p. 323) mentions that 
"having to submit entire strategies forces participants 
to think about each information set in a different 
way than if they could primarily concentrate on those 
information sets that may arise in the course of the 
game." This method may, hence, capture more reflec- 
tive behavior. In contrast, there is clearly a certain 
16Charness and Rabin (2001) provide evidence that this role- 
reversal approach does not appear to affect behavior in simple 
games; in 19 games tested using both with and without role 
reversal. 
17 We chose not to elicit contingent responses to messages, as we 
were concerned that asking people to first envision a hypotheti- 
cal message and then consider their hypothetical responses to this 
hypothetical message might be pushing the strategy method too far. 
Double hypothetical responses are considerably more abstract and 
complex, and the risk of confusing the experimental participants 
seemed unacceptably high. In addition, handing a person a slip of 
paper marked in pen may be helpful in establishing experimental 
credibility. 
element of immediacy to receiving information about 
an actual choice. One might expect that some actions 
would trigger stronger emotional responses in such 
an environment. Many social psychologists feel that 
visceral elements have a strong effect on behavior. For 
example, Loewenstein (1996) observes that such fac- 
tors may cause people to be "out of control" and act 
against their own self-interest. 
Because it is quite plausible that punishment behav- 
ior may be different when responders are presented 
with actual Al or A2 play, we tested whether a behav- 
ioral effect from deception is also observed under 
more visceral conditions.18 We conducted three addi- 
tional sessions in which each responder was told the 
choice actually made by the first mover, and made a 
direct response only to this choice. The design in these 
sessions was otherwise identical to that in the initial 
five sessions. 
4. Results 
4.1. Strategy-Method Sessions 
Tables 1 and 2 present a summary of the data from 
the strategy-method sessions involving 118 subjects, 
where the notation s(Al) and s(A2) refers to Al and 
A2 messages, respectively. By punishment, we refer to 
the receiver choosing payoffs (2, 2) after an (A2, B2) 
realization and by reward to the choice of (8, 7) after 
(Al, B2). We remind the reader that each receiver was 
asked to designate separate choices for the case where 
the sender actually played Al and the case where the 
sender actually played A2.19 
18However, evidence from simple experimental games has sug- 
gested that the elicitation method does not significantly affect 
responses. Brandts and Charness (2000) specifically study this ques- 
tion in two 2-person binary-choice games (Prisoners' Dilemma and 
Chicken) and find no significant difference in behavior due to the 
elicitation method. Schotter et al. (1994) examine a simple game 
involving two choices per player. Holding the representation of 
the game (as a tree) constant, they find no difference between 
the strategy and direct-response-elicitation methods. Nevertheless, 
these studies do not involve reactions to dishonest behavior. 
19 While each B player thus made two choices, each statistical test 
used contains only one of these choices (B's action if Al was chosen 
or if A2 was chosen). Because these tests are separately run, there 
is no problem of multiple observations per participant. 
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Table 1 Strategy-Method Play in Stages One and Two 
A B 
Message Play Al Play A2 Play B1 Play B2 
s(A1) 51/76 25/76 4/76 72/76 
(67%) (33%) (5%) (95%) 
s(A2) 11/42 31/42 2/42 40/42 
(26%) (74%) (5%) (95%) 
Most A players (76/118, or 64.4%) chose an A1 mes- 
sage. We find that about one-third (25/76) of all A1 
messages are false, as they are followed by A2 play. 
Overall, nearly 70% of all participants play in accor- 
dance with the message they sent. Perhaps, reassur- 
ingly, 95% of the subjects played B2. If one interprets 
the choice of B1 as a pure mistake, note that a 5% 
"error rate" is not unusual in laboratory experiments. 
Note that the same proportion of B players played B2 
whether the message was A1 or A2. 
We use the test of the equality of proportions (Glas- 
napp and Poggio 1985) to test for significance. The Z- 
statistic reported is the normal approximation to the 
binary distribution, defined by the difference between 
the proportions divided by the standard error of the 
difference. The overall punishment rate, 24/109, is 
significantly different from zero (Z = 5.19, p < 0.0001), 
rejecting the predictions of the standard model in 
favor of Hypothesis 1.20 
The punishment rate of action A2 is substantially 
and significantly higher given a false signal. As we 
have a directional hypothesis regarding the punish- 
ment rates, we use a one-tailed test and find the 
difference significant at p = 0.034.21 This is support 
for the general notion that the process by which an 
outcome is reached affects its ultimate attractiveness; 
specifically, we reject the predictions of the null in 
20 While there should be 112 total responses to A1 and A2 messages 
(118 subjects less those 6 who played B1), 3 subjects failed to indi- 
cate a response to a hypothetical A2 play and 1 subject failed to 
indicate a response to a hypothetical A1 play. Thus, there are only 
109 total responses to A2 play and 111 total responses to A1 play. 
21 It is standard practice in hypothesis testing to use a one-tailed 
test when there is an ex ante directional hypothesis (see Siegel and 
Castellan 1988, p. 8). 
Table 2 B's Punishment and Reward Rates (Strategy Method) 
Reaction s(A1) s(A2) Z-Statistic 
Reward A1 10/72 9/39 -1.23 
(14%) (23%) 
Punish A2 19/69 5/40 1.83 
(28%) (12%) 
favor of Hypothesis 2.22 A deceptive message is not 
seen to be appropriate by many participants and a 
substantial number of these are willing to sacrifice 
money to express their displeasure. 
We also find that, overall, 19 out of 111 subjects, 
over 17%, chose to reward a play of A1. This evi- 
dence is favorable to our third alternative hypothesis, 
because this is significantly different from 0% (Z = 
4.58, p < 0.0001). We also feel that the 17% reward 
rate is much higher than what would have been 
obtained if we simply gave B players unilateral power 
to choose (6, 9) or (8, 7) and had no messages, as it is 
rare for an experimental participant to elect to receive 
less than another person when a choice to receive 
more is available. As we do not run this treatment, we 
cannot make strong claims, but this is, nevertheless, 
suggestive of some kind of positive reciprocity.23 
4.2. Direct-Response Sessions 
Tables 3 and 4 present a summary of the data from 
the direct-response sessions involving 94 subjects. The 
results in stages 1 and 2 are similar to those in the 
strategy-method sessions. A slightly higher propor- 
tion (69 of 94 or 73.4%) of A's chose an A1 message 
and a slightly lower proportion (16/69) of all A1 mes- 
sages are false. The Z-statistics for these comparisons 
are 1.40 and 1.30, respectively, so that the differences 
are not statistically significant. Once again, nearly all 
(98%, Z = 1.12, n.s., for the strategy-method compari- 
son) of the B subjects played B2, with a slightly higher 
rate of B1 play after an A2 message. 
22 An argument could be made that the true difference in rates is 
higher, as the punishments after an A2 play and an A2 message 
may include some B's who would have played B1, except for the 
small chance of an A1 play. 
23 Interestingly, the reward rate is more than 50% higher when A1 
is played after an A2 message, although the difference is not statis- 
tically significant with the small N. Perhaps people respond more 
favorably when the sender shows a favorable change of heart. 
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Table 3 Direct-Response Play in Stages One and Two 
A B 
Message Play Al Play A2 Play B1 Play B2 
s(A1) 53/69 16/69 0/69 69/69 
(77%) (23%) (0%) (100%) 
s(A2) 3/25 22/25 2/25 23/25 
(12%) (88%) (8%) (92%) 
Table 4 B's Punishment and Reward Rates (Direct Response) 
Reaction s(A1) s(A2) Z-Statistic 
Reward A1 13/53 0/3 0.98 
(25%) (0%) 
Punish A2 9/16 6/22 1.80 
(56%) (27%) 
The overall punishment rate, 15/38, is again signif- 
icant (Z = 4.32, p < 0.0001). Behavior in these sessions 
also shows a strong effect from deception, with pun- 
ishment rates still about twice as high after an A1 
signal and A2 play. Using the one-tailed test, the dif- 
ference is significant at p = 0.036, a similar value to 
the one for the strategy-method sessions.24 However, 
these punishment rates were approximately double 
those found using the strategy method. Although we 
conclude that the effect of deception is robust to the 
elicitation method, there does, indeed, appear to be 
an effect on the punishment-rate level (and perhaps 
the reward rate) from a more visceral environment. 
There is an overall reward rate of 23% (13 of 56), 
which is significantly different from 0% (Z = 3.83, p < 
0.0001). This rate is slightly higher than that in the 
strategy-method sessions, but the difference is not sig- 
nificant (Z = 0.95). There is no significant difference 
in reward rates across messages, although the test is 
weak because there are few subjects who chose A1 
after an A2 message. In summary, our data are con- 
sistent with our three alternative hypotheses. 
24 If we pool the rejection data across elicitation methods, the dif- 
ference in punishment rates after A1 and A2 signals is significant 
at p = 0.02 (one-tailed test) or 0.04 (two-tailed test). 
Table 5 Consistency Across Roles (Pooled Data) 
Punish lie Don't punish Reward Don't reward 
Attitude as B lie as B A1 as B A1 as B 
Lie as A 3/28 25/28 4/34 30/34 
(11%) (89%) (12%) (88%) 
Don't lie as A 32/79 47/79 28/133 105/133 
(41%) (59%) (21%) (79%) 
4.3. Role-Rotation and Consistency 
Because we use role rotation in our experimental 
design, we can examine whether people exhibit a 
"consistent attitude" toward punishment and reward 
behavior. By this, we mean that people who punish a 
false message or reward an A1 play are less likely to 
be deceptive and are more likely to play A1. Table 5 
illustrates this internal consistency. 
There is a strong relationship between whether one 
lies as A and one's willingness to punish a lie. Those 
people who do not lie in the A role are nearly four 
times as likely to punish in the B role. The Z-statistic 
for the difference of proportions is 2.89 (p = 0.002, 
one-tailed test) for punishment, showing a behav- 
ioral consistency with respect to punishment. This 
"internal consistency" is an indication that subjects 
understand the situation, and parallels results such as 
Kahnemann et al. (1986), where 88% chose to punish 
a selfish chooser (sacrificing $1) if they had not them- 
selves been selfish choosers, but only 31% punished 
behavior they would engage in themselves. 
On the other hand, the correlation between lies and 
rewards is not as strong. Because these are very differ- 
ent acts, perhaps this should not be surprising. People 
who lie as A are less likely to reward than those who 
don't lie, but the difference is only slight, and, at best, 
marginally significant (Z = 1.23, p = 0.109, one-tailed 
test). 
4.4. Ex Post Profitability 
How do the effective levels of retribution affect play- 
ers' material payoffs? Table 6 shows expected material 
payoffs for all combinations of message and action.25 
25 Given receivers' behavior, it appears that material payoffs 
account only for part of their motivation. The other part stems from 
the satisfaction of punishing a self-serving lie and of rewarding a 
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Table 6 Ex Post Expected Material Payoffs (Strategy Method) 
Sender Receiver Combined 
Message, expected expected expected 
action payoff payoff payoff 
s(A2), A2 10.36 2.84 13.20 
s(A1), A2 8.86 2.69 11.55 
s(A2), A1 6.23 8.25 14.48 
s(A1), Al 6.05 8.38 14.43 
If a sender only cares about his own material payoff, 
he should signal A2 and then play A2; it does not pay 
to send an Al message prior to an A2 play.26 
On the other hand, a sender with a sufficient pos- 
itive weight on the receiver's material payoff should 
play Al, as this leads to higher social benefits than A2, 
regardless of the signal. We see (Table 1) that 53% of 
senders play Al, giving them lower expected material 
payoffs ex post than from an A2 play. While we can- 
not know precisely why this choice was made (per- 
haps an exaggerated fear of punishment), the results 
suggest that this may reflect prosocial behavior.27 
Ex post, A could choose (A, B) payoffs of (8.69, 2.67) 
or (6.49, 8.51). The latter is more efficient, but A may 
not wish to sacrifice 2.10 to increase B's payoff by 5.84. 
Note that the response elicitation method has little 
effect on the orderings of the expected payoffs. 
5. Discussion 
Previous studies indicate that process satisfaction is 
a highly salient consideration in many environments. 
pleasant surprise. It is conceivable that senders' payoffs are also 
affected by a nonmaterial component, although this force is more 
difficult to gauge; senders may derive some satisfaction from send- 
ing a truthful message. 
26 This result suggests that in a dynamic relationship, false messages 
would be driven out, since ultimately they are not in the sender's 
interest. However, our focus here is on the study of preferences. 
For this purpose what matters are the reactions to false statements, 
when they are made. 
27 We can examine the economic effects of the punishment of false 
messages by comparing the expected payoffs shown in the first and 
second rows of Table 3. If one relates the reductions of sender and 
receiver payoffs to the largest possible reduction from the payoffs 
shown in the first row of Table 3 down to a payoff of 2, one obtains 
a fraction of 1.5/8.36 for the sender and of 0.15/0.84 for the receiver. 
Both fractions are close to 18%. 
Table 7 Ex Post Expected Material Payoffs (Direct Response) 
Sender Receiver Combined 
Message, expected expected expected 
action payoff payoff payoff 
s(A2), A2 8.69 2.67 11.36 
s(A1), A2 6.38 2.44 8.82 
s(A2), Al 5.52 8.44 13.96 
s(A1), Al 6.49 8.51 15.00 
The negotiation and business ethics literature sug- 
gests that deception, while a fairly common practice, 
often induces negative responses. Generally, people 
react in an adverse manner when they feel that their 
right to fair treatment has been violated. In accor- 
dance with this view, we find that false messages 
lead to punishment more frequently than do accurate 
messages, although the choices between culmination 
outcomes are the same in both cases; this holds for 
both the strategy and the direct-response elicitation 
methods. People appear to have a per se objection to 
deception, even when it does not affect their actions 
or material payoffs, or future relationships. 
In addition, while responses to favorable play are 
not our primary focus, we do find that many peo- 
ple donate money in response, choosing to come 
out behind; this suggests the presence of some kind 
of positive reciprocity. We also find that a message 
receiver's decision, whether to punish deception or 
reward a favorable play, is significantly correlated 
with his behavior as a message sender. This is evi- 
dence that the decision to punish is part of a consis- 
tent value orientation rather than being simply arbi- 
trary or random. 
While our results provide a clean illustration (with 
monetary incentives) of the consequences of decep- 
tion, the effect may be a bit surprising, as false mes- 
sages are explicitly permitted in the instructions and 
there is no obvious deterrent value for punishment. 
Because a deceived person who plays B2 can always 
obtain the material payoff available from playing B1, 
deception does not reduce that person's choice set. 
Therefore, it seems that people simply do not like 
being misled as such and that this triggers a taste 
for punishment, which may be related to self-respect 
issues. 
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Punishment has been defined (Kadzin 1977) as the 
presentation of an adverse event or the removal of 
a positive event following a response. Romer (1996) 
suggests two reasons that people may choose to 
threaten (and impose) punishment. Threats of pun- 
ishment may have strategic value (even in the static 
case) or actual punishment may have future deterrent 
value (dynamic case). A person may also have a taste 
for punishing others that is triggered by a sequence 
of events. In this case, a person punishes because it is 
satisfying to do so. Given the nonrepeated nature of 
our design, there should be no deterrence motivation 
or future financial considerations.28 
Throughout this paper, we have implicitly assumed 
that lies will invariably be detected. While we feel that 
the true state of affairs is often eventually revealed 
in negotiations and organizations, there may be sit- 
uations where the probability of detection is low. In 
such cases, the probability of punishment would be 
correspondingly lower, so that deception might well 
be strategically effective. However, the credibility of a 
deceptive act might also be reduced if the would-be 
deceived party knows there is only a small probability 
of detecting deception. In addition, the use of punish- 
ment itself may depend on material payoffs. Zwick 
and Chen (1998) find that the higher the "price" 
of fairness, the lower the demand for it. We might 
also expect less punishment where it is not as cost 
effective. 
Our experiment is an instance of the influence of 
intention-promises and deception. This is an impor- 
tant issue in potentially cooperative negotiations and 
business environments, where trust can lead to mutu- 
ally beneficial outcomes. Are breaches of trust per- 
ceived by some to be per se violations of the Sen 
(1997) behavioral social norms?29 In this case, one's 
distaste for being played the fool can be enough to 
generate the urge to punish the transgressor, even if 
28 It is also possible that people are willing to provide a socially ben- 
eficial "object lesson" to deter further antisocial behavior outside 
the laboratory. 
29 While deception could be construed to be an act that violates 
a behavioral social norm, Sen (1997) does not include this factor 
in the model presented. He writes (p. 751) that "Some types of 
influences of choice acts are more easy to formalize than others, and 
these include: (i) chooser dependence, and (ii) menu dependence." 
no money is lost. While this seems difficult to model, 
perhaps one could tie the degree of disappointment 
from a breach to the change in expectations (or the 
reference level) induced by a false promise. This could 
relate to the let down aversion postulated by Dufwen- 
berg and Gneezy (2000). 
Our results have implications for theories of human 
motivation in economic contexts. All current models 
of social utility predict some punishment for A2 play. 
However, we have seen that these models do not pre- 
dict the differences in punishment rates observed in 
our experimental game. While this is not surprising 
for models that do not reflect the process by which an 
outcome has been reached, it points out a blind spot 
in models that try to address process satisfaction by 
only considering the intentions of other entities. 
Our work has value for organizational decision 
makers as it combines insights from psychology 
and economics and suggests that process satisfaction 
is important in economic environments. Managers 
should be cautious about the use of deception, as the 
people they supervise may adversely react upon dis- 
covery of the deceit. Violations of implicit codes of 
conduct cause displeasure, even if there is no clear 
financial harm. In the field, there may well be ongoing 
relationships among people who interact, so that an 
immediate negative reaction may have far-reaching 
adverse effects. 
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